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Abstract: Will capital controls enhance macro economy stability? How will the results be 
influenced by the exchange rate regime and monetary policy reaction? Are the consequences of 
policy decisions involving capital controls easily predictable, or more complicated than may have 
been anticipated? We will answer the above questions by investigating the macroeconomic 
dynamics of a small open economy.  In recent years, these matters have become particularly 
important to emerging market economies, which have often adopted capital controls. We 
especially investigate two dynamical characteristics: indeterminacy and bifurcation. Four cases are 
explored, based on different exchange rate regimes and monetary policy rules. 
With capital controls in place, we find that indeterminacy depends upon how inflation and 
output gap coordinate with each other in their feedback to interest rate setting in the Taylor rule. 
When forward-looking, both passive and positive monetary policy feedback can lead to 
indeterminacy. Compared with flexible exchange rates, fixed exchange rate regimes produce more 
complex indeterminacy conditions, depending upon the stickiness of prices and the elasticity of 
substitution between labor and consumption. We find Hopf bifurcation under capital control with 
fixed exchange rates and current-looking monetary policy. To determine empirical relevance, we 
test indeterminacy empirically using Bayesian estimation. Fixed exchange rate regimes with 
capital controls produce larger posterior probability of the indeterminate region than a flexible 
exchange rate regime. Fixed exchange rate regimes with current-looking monetary policy lead to 
several kinds of bifurcation under capital controls. 
We provide monetary policy suggestions on achieving macroeconomic stability through 
financial regulation. 
JEL Code: F41, F31, F38, E52, C11, C62 
Key Words: Capital controls, open economy monetary policy, exchange rate regimes, Bayesian 
methods, bifurcation, indeterminacy. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the Great Recession following the 2008 financial crisis, the potential problems caused by 
free capital movements among countries have drawn attention to the relationship between financial 
regulation, capital controls, and macroeconomic stability. Some researchers support capital controls 
with prudential macroeconomic policy. According to that view, capital controls can mitigate systemic 
risk, reduce business cycle volatility, and increase macroeconomic stability. Related research includes 
Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014), Korinek (2011, 2014), Ostry et al. (2012), and Magud et al. (2012). 
According to Mundell’s (1963) “impossible trinity” in international economics, an open economy 
cannot simultaneously have independent monetary policy, fixed exchange rates, and free capital 
movement.1 Under prudential macroeconomic policy with control of capital flows, we investigate 
combinations of exchange rate regimes and monetary policies that  could stabilize the economy. Is it 
possible that the choices of exchange rate regime and monetary policy could generate instability and 
increased volatility, even though capital flows are controlled? How to make such policy decisions and 
to what extent the policy should be adjusted are challenging questions relevant to all monetary 
authorities. 
In this paper, we explore the dynamics of an economic system with capital controls. We investigate 
the possible instability or non-uniqueness of equilibria and their relevancy to policy under capital 
controls. In contrast, Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014) and Korinek (2011, 2014) study welfare 
implications of capital controls from a theoretic perspective, while Ostry et al. (2012) and Magud et al. 
(2012) investigate the relationship of capital controls to macroeconomic stability using empirical 
methods. Our contribution is to investigate dynamical characteristics with emphasis on indeterminacy 
and bifurcation. 
Indeterminacy occurs if the equilibrium of an economic system is not unique, resulting in the 
existence of multiple equilibria. Under those circumstances, consumers’ and firms’ forecasts of 
macroeconomic variables, such as output and inflation rates, can lead to the phenomenon of “self-
fulfilling prophecy.” The economy can move from one equilibrium to another. A new equilibrium, 
driven by economic agents’ beliefs, could be a better one or a worse one. If capital controls signal to 
people that they are protected from the risk of international financial market volatility, then the beliefs-
driven equilibrium may be better than without those controls. Alternatively, if imposition of capital 
controls produces panic and induces evasion of the controls, the equilibrium can be worse than 
                                                          
1 Mundell’s (1963) “impossible trinity” is alternatively often called the “Mundell-Fleming trilemma” to 
recognize the relevancy of Fleming (1962). 
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equilibrium without capital controls. As a result, we investigate existence of multiple equilibria in an 
open economy with different exchange rate regimes and monetary policies. We also empirically 
examine indeterminacy using Bayesian methods to estimate the probability of the indeterminacy region.  
We also acquire the posterior estimates of parameters and the impulse responses under both 
fundamental shocks and sunspot shocks. 
We find that the existence of indeterminacy depends upon how inflation and output gap 
coordinate with each other in their feedback to interest rate setting in the Taylor rule. Our results 
expand the conclusions of previous literature on indeterminacy and monetary policy to the case of 
capital controls. See, e.g., Cochrane (2011) and Benhabib et al. (2001). When monetary policy is 
forward looking with capital controls,  we find that both passive feedback and positive feedback can 
generate indeterminacy.2 
The exchange rate regime can alter the conditions for indeterminacy. Compared with flexible 
exchange rates, a fixed exchange regime produces more complex conditions, depending on the 
stickiness of price setting and the elasticity of substitution between labor and consumption. Interestingly, 
the degree of openness does not play a lare role in our results. This difference from previous literature 
evidently is associated with the control of international capital mobility. 
We introduce into our model incompleteness of international capital markets and staggered price 
setting, in contrast with Airaudo and Zanna (2012), who analyze global equilibrium determinacy in a 
flexible-price open economy with active interest rate rules on inflation. Benhabib and Farmer (1999) 
find that staggered price setting can cause indeterminacy to arise. We find that when price is close to 
flexible with capital controls, indeterminacy is possible. 
The other primary objective of our paper is to investigate existence of bifurcation phenomena in an 
open economy with capital controls. Bifurcation is definited to occur, if a qualitative change in 
dynamics occurs, when the bifurcation boundary is crossed by the deep parameters of the economy’s 
structure. Such deep parameters are not only those of private tastes and technology, but also of monetary 
policy rules. Such qualitative change can be between instability and stability. But the change can also 
be between different kinds of instability or between different kinds of stability, such as monotonic 
stability and periodic damped stability, or multiperiodic damped stabilitiy. Existence of bifurcation 
boundaries can motivate policy intervention. A slight change to the parameters of private tastes or 
                                                          
2 With passive feedback, the parameter multiplied by inflation or output gap in Taylor rule is defined to be 
between 0 and 1. With positive feedback, the parameter is larger than 1. 
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technology or to the parameters of central bank feedbacks of output and inflation to policy instruments 
can induce a fundamental change in the nature of the economy’s dynamics. 
The previous literature investigating bifurcation without capital controls includes Barnett and 
Duzhak (2008, 2010, 2014), Barnett and Eryilmaz (2013, 2014), and the survey paper Barnett and Chen 
(2015).  In contrast, we introduce capital controls and an exchange rate peg. Without capital controls, 
Woodford (1986, 1992) and Franke (1992) find that capital market imperfections can lead to more 
complex dynamics than perfect capital markets. We find that there can exist Hopf bifurcation under 
capital controls, fixed exchange rates, and current-looking monetary policy. We determine the 
conditions under which the monetary policy rule or private deep parameters will generate instability. 
We encounter several kinds of bifurcation, when the model’s parameters are estimated by Bayesian 
methods.  
This paper is structured as follows. We illustrate the model in Section 2 and derive the equilibria 
in Section 3. The dynamical systems under different exchange rate regimes and monetary policies are 
discussed in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6, we analyze the conditions for indeterminacy and bifurcation. 
We discuss the economic implications in Section 7. In Sections 8 and 9, we test indeterminacy 
empirically and locate bifurcation boundaries numerically. Section 10 is the conclusion. 
2. Model 
In light of Gali and Monacelli (2005) and Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014), our model is an open 
economy New Keynesian model consisting of a small open economy that imposes capital controls and 
chooses between flexible exchange rates and fixed exchange rates. Compared with the Mundell 
Fleming IS-LM-BP model, the New Keynesian model has solid micro-foundation on both the demand 
side and the supply side. As a result, we are able to analyze the influence of the deep structural 
parameters on the economy’s dynamics. 
In contrast with Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014), we choose the discrete time version of the linear 
rational expectations model, instead of the continuous time model, to facilitate analyzing the 
indeterminacy and bifurcation conditions. For analyzing indeterminacy, the linear rational expectations 
model automatically fixes the list of predetermined variables, thereby eliminating the need to 
differentiate between predetermined variables and jump variables.3 Discrete time also permits location 
of bifurcation boundaries in linear system, as in Barnett and Duzhak (2008, 2010, and 2014) and Barnett 
and Eryilmaz (2013, 2014). In addition, rational expectations allows us to differentiate between 
                                                          
3 See Sims (2002). 
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fundamental shocks and non-fundamental forecasting errors. Farmer et al. (2015) and Beyer and Farmer 
(2004) find methods to change the system from indeterminate to determinate by moving the non-
fundamental forecasting errors.  The number of those errors equals the degree of indeterminacy to the 
fundamental shocks set. In the rational expectations model, it is possible for beliefs to drive the 
economy to another path that converges to a steady state, producing a self-fulfilling prophecy. In 
principle, it is possible to regulate or influence those beliefs. This phenomenon is different from “animal 
spirit.” 
There is a continuum of small open economies, indexed along the unit interval. Different economies 
share identical preferences, technology, and market structure. Following the conventions in this 
literature, we use variables without i-index to refer to the small open economy being modelled. 
Variables with i-index refer to variables in economy i, among the continuum of economies making up 
the world economy. Variables with a star correspond to the world economy as a whole, while j denotes 
a particular good within an economy. 
2.1. Households 
A representative household seeks to maximize 
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The parameter ε  > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution among goods within any given country. The 
parameter α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of home bias in preferences and is an index of openness, while 
η  > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, and γ measures the 
elasticity of substitution among goods produced in different countries. 
The household’s budget constraint takes the form 
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where 1tD +  is holding of the home portfolio, consisting of shares in firms. Holding of country i’s 
portfolio is 1
i
tD + , while , 1t tQ +  is the price of the home portfolio, and , 1
i
t tQ + is the price of country i’s 
portfolio. The nominal wage is tW . The lump-sum transfer/tax at t is tT . We model the capital control, 
following Farhi and Werning (2014), with tτ  denoting the subsidy on capital outflows (tax on capital 
inflows) in home country and itτ  denoting the subsidy on capital outflows (tax on capital inflows) in 
country i. We assume that country i does not impose capital control, so that itτ  = 0. Taxes on capital 
inflows are rebated as a lump sum to households. We introduce variables that capture the dynamics of 
capital control, tτ , where 1 111 t tt
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The optimal allocation of expenditures on imported goods by country of origin implies
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The optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported goods is given by 
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The effective nominal exchange rate is devined by
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The log-linearized form is 
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For the representative household in country i, the problem is to maximize 
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subject to the budget constraint 
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Notice that there is no capital control in country i. 
The first order conditions also provides us with two Euler equations  
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Combined with the two Euler equations for the home country, we get 
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where we define ∆  and Θ  to be the variables that captures the dynamics of tτ , such that 
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Taking the log we get ( )1 1t t tτ σ θ θ+ += − , 
resulting in the Backus-Smith condition, 
1
,
i
t t t i tC C σ= Θ  .                                                                                                                                         (15) 
Taking logs on both sides and integrating over i, we get 
* 1
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2.2. Uncovered Interest Parity, Purchasing Power Parity, Terms of Trade, and Exchange Rate 
The pricing equation for foreign bonds and domestic bonds are respectively 
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We combine them to get the Uncovered Interest Parity conditions, 
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,
,
,
i t
i t
H t
P
S
P
≡  . 
The effective terms of trade are 
10 
 
( )
1
1 1, 1
,0
,
F t
t i t
H t
P
S S di
P
γγ −−≡ = ∫  . 
Log linearizing we get 
, ,t F t H ts p p≡ − ,  
1
,0t i t
s s di= ∫  (when 1γ = ). 
Under the purchasing power parity condition, , ,H t F tP P= , so that 1tS = . 
Log linearizing, ( )( ) ( )
1
1 1 1
, ,1t H t F tP P P
η η ηα α
− − − ≡ − +
 
 becomes 
( ) , , ,1t H t F t H t tp p p p sα α α≡ − + = + , when 1η = . 
It follows that  
( ), 1t H t t ts sπ π α −= + −   
and  
{ } { } { }1 , 1 1t t t H t t t tE E E s sπ π α+ + += + −   .                                                                                 (20) 
The bilateral nominal exchange rate is defined by the law of one price, 
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We can rewrite the uncovered interest parity condition as 
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2.3. Firms 
The supply side in this paper is the same as in Gali and Monacelli (2005). Details of the derivation 
can be found in their paper.  
A representative firm in the home country has a linear technology, 
( ) ( )t t tY j A N j= ,                                                                                                                                       (24) 
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The firm follows staggered-price setting, as in Calvo’s (1983) model. Each period, 1 ω−  of firms set 
new prices. The pricing decision is forward-looking. Firms set the price as a mark-up over a weighted 
average of expected future marginal costs. As 0ω →  , the price approaches flexibility. 
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The dynamics of domestic inflation are given by 
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3. Equilibrium 
In this section, we assume that 1σ η γ= = =  (Cole-Obstfeld case). 
3.1. Demand Side 
The market clearing condition in the representative small open economy is 
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∫ , we get 
( )
1, , ,
,0
,
1
i
H t i t F t i
t t i t t
t H t
P P
Y C C di
P P
γ ηη
ηα α
−−      = − +          
∫

  , 
( ) 11t t t tY S Cα α α − = − + Θ   . 
The first-order log linear approximation is 
t t t ty s cα θ= + − .                                                                                                                                             (27) 
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Substituting this into { } { }( )1 1
1
t t t t t tc E c r E π ρσ+ +
= − − − , we get 
{ } { }( ) { } { }1 1 1 1t t t t t t t t t t t ty E y r E E s s Eπ ρ α θ θ+ + + += − − − − − + −       .                                          (28) 
3.2. Supply Side 
At the steady state of the economy, we have 
t t ty a n= + .                                                                                                                                                       (29) 
The real marginal cost is 
t t t t tmc c n s aν ϕ α= − + + + − ,                                                                                                                     (30) 
while the steady state real marginal cost is 
mc µ≡ − .  
The deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state is 
 ( )( )1t t t t t t t t tmc mc mc c n s a y aµ ν ϕ α µ ν ϕ θ≡ − = − + + + − = − + + − + . 
Thus at equilibrium, the dynamic equation for inflation is 
{ }  { } ( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 , 1 1 1H t t H t t t H t t t tE mc E y aπ β π λ β π λ µ ν λ ϕ λ ϕ λθ+ += + = + − + + − + + .             (31) 
3.3. Equilibrium Dynamics in Output Gap 
The natural level of output is defined to be the equilibrium output in the absence of nominal rigidities, 
where the deviation of real marginal cost from its steady state equals 0, as follows: 

10
1 1t t t t
mc y a ν µθ
ϕ ϕ
−
= ⇒ = − +
+ +
.   
The output gap is defined to be the following deviation of output from its natural level: 
t t tx y y≡ − , so that  
1
1 1t t t t t t
y x y x a ν µθ
ϕ ϕ
 −
= + = + − + + + 
. 
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We substitute that equation into the dynamics of output and inflation and also substitute 1tπ + into 
the expression of , 1H tπ +  to acquire 
{ } { } { } { }1 , 1 1 11t t t t t H t t t t t t tx E x r E E a a E
ϕπ ρ θ θ
ϕ+ + + +
 = − − − + − + −        +
,                                (32) 
{ } ( ), , 1 1H t t H t tE xπ β π λ ϕ+= + + ,                                                                                                                 (33) 
together with the uncovered interest parity condition 
{ } { } { } { }* *1 1 , 1 1t t t t t t t t t H t t tr r E E s s E Eθ θ π π+ + + +− = − + − + −       . 
The above three equations constitute the dynamics of the economy with capital controls and flexible 
exchange rates, but without monetary policy.  
If the exchange rate is fixed, then 1t te e+ = , so that   
{ } { } { }*, 1 1 1t H t t t t t tE E E s sπ π+ + += − −   , 
{ }* 1t t t t tr r E θ θ+− = −   .  
In the following sections of this paper, we assume that purchasing power parity holds, so that 1tS =
and { }1 0t t tE s s+ − =   . 
4. Capital Control, Exchange Rate Regime and Monetary Policy: Four Cases 
In this section, we summarize four cases of the dynamical system, such that the exchange rate regime 
can be flexible or fixed and monetary policy can be current-looking or forward-looking. 
4.1. Case 1: Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary Policy 
This case is characterized by the following equations: 
1 , 1 1 1
, , 1
* *
1 , 1 1
,
( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ],
1
( ) ( 1) ,
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ),
.
t t t t t H t t t t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t t H t t t
t H t x t
x E x r E E a a E
E x
r r E E E
r a a x
+ + + +
+
+ + +
= − − − + − + −
+
= + +
− = − + −
= +π
ϕπ ρ θ θ
ϕ
π β π λ ϕ
θ θ π π
π
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4.2. Case 2: Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Current-looking Monetary Policy 
This case is characterized by the following equations: 
1 , 1 1 1
, , 1
*
1
,
( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ],
1
( ) ( 1) ,
[ ( ) ],
.
t t t t t H t t t t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t
t H t x t
x E x r E E a a E
E x
r r E
r a a x
+ + + +
+
+
= − − − + − + −
+
= + +
− = −
= +π
ϕπ ρ θ θ
ϕ
π β π λ ϕ
θ θ
π
 
4.3. Case 3: Capital Control, Flexible Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary Policy 
This case is characterized by the following equations: 
1 , 1 1 1
, , 1
* *
1 , 1 1
, 1 1
( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ],
1
( ) ( 1) ,
[ ( ) ] ( ) ( ),
( ) ( ).
t t t t t H t t t t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t t H t t t
t t H t x t t
x E x r E E a a E
E x
r r E E E
r a E a E x
+ + + +
+
+ + +
+ +
= − − − + − + −
+
= + +
− = − + −
= +π
ϕπ ρ θ θ
ϕ
π β π λ ϕ
θ θ π π
π
 
4.4. Case 4: Capital Control, Fixed Exchange Rate, Forward-looking Monetary Policy 
This case is characterized by the following equations: 
1 , 1 1 1
, , 1
*
1
, 1 1
( ) [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ] [ ( ) ],
1
( ) ( 1) ,
[ ( ) ],
( ) ( ).
t t t t t H t t t t t t t
H t t H t t
t t t t t
t t H t x t t
x E x r E E a a E
E x
r r E
r a E a E x
+ + + +
+
+
+ +
= − − − + − + −
+
= + +
− = −
= +π
ϕπ ρ θ θ
ϕ
π β π λ ϕ
θ θ
π
 
The four cases have the same IS curve and Phillips curve. The differences lie in the uncovered 
interest parity conditions between flexible exchange rates and fixed exchange rates, and in the interest 
rate feedback rule between current-looking monetary policy and forward-looking monetary policy. It 
should be observed that our uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition is somewhat unusual. The usual 
UIP condition mainly describes the relationship between exchange rates and nominal interest rates. In 
our UIP condition, the nominal interest rate depends upon capital controls and upon how large the 
expectation of future domestic inflation will deviate from world inflation.  
16 
 
If the capital flow is free, so that ( )1 1 0t t tτ σ θ θ+ += − = , then under fixed exchange rates, the 
domestic nominal interest rate should equal the world nominal interest rate. As a result, the monetary 
authority loses its autonomy, in accordance with Mundell’s trilemma. Second, under flexible exchange 
rates, the expectation of future world inflation plays a role in the dynamical system. Even though the 
domestic government stops targeting exchange rates and allows the exchange rate to float freely, the 
system is still influenced by expectations of the world inflation.  
We also investigate how expectations about future domestic inflation and output gap change the 
results of our analysis, compared with current-looking monetary policy with the central bank setting 
the nominal interest rate. 
5. Indeterminacy 
In this section we investigate the indeterminacy conditions for the four cases of policy combinations. 
We follow the method for linear rational expectations models by Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), Lubik 
and Schorfheide (2004), Lubik and Marzo (2007), Sims (2002), Farmer et al. (2015), Beyer and Farmer 
(2004).  
In Lubik and Schorfheide (2003), the indeterminacy condition is provided as follows. First, the 
system can be written as 
0 1 1t t t t−= + +Γ X Γ X Ψε Πη , 
where tX is the 1n×  vector of endogenous variables and their expectations, while tε  is the 1l×  vector 
of exogenous variables, and tη is the 1k ×  vector of non-fundamental forecasting errors. Those forecast 
errors represent beliefs and permit self-fulfilling equilibria. 
The reduced form of the above system is 
1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0t t t t
− − −
−= + +X Γ Γ X Γ Ψε Γ Πη . 
Applying generalized Schur decomposition (also called QZ decomposition) and letting t t′=w Z X , the 
equation above can be written as 
1, 1, 1 1.11 12 11 12
2, 2, 1 2.22 22
( )
0 0
t t
t t
t t
−
−
        
= + +        
        
w w QΛ Λ Ω Ω
Ψε Πη
w w QΛ Ω
.   
It is assumed that the following 1m×  vector, 2,tw , is purely explosive, where 0 m n≤ ≤ : 
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1 1
2, 22 22 2, 1 22 2. ( )t t t t
− −
−= + +w Λ Ω w Λ Q Ψε Πη .  
A non-explosive solution of the linear rational expectation model for tX exists, if 2,0 =w 0  and 
2. 2. 0t t+ =Q Ψε Q Πη .  
By singular value decomposition of 2.Q Π , we find  
[ ] .1112. .1 .2 .1 11 .1
.2
′  ′ ′= = =   ′   
VD 0
Q Π UDV U U U D V
V0 0
 . 
The m explosive components of tX generate r m≤  restrictions for the expectation errors. The stability 
condition can be rewritten as 
.1 11 .1 .1( ) 0t t′ ′+ =U D V λε V η .  
Let 1 2t t t= +η A ε A ζ  , where tζ  is a 1p×  vector of sunspot shocks. The solution for the forecast 
errors is 
1
.1 11 .1 2. .2 1 .2 2( )t t t
− ′= − + +η V D U Q Ψ V M ε V M ζ .  
When the dimension of the vector of forecast errors, k, equals the number of stability restrictions, r, the 
linear rational expectations model has a unique solution. When k r> , there is indeterminacy (multiple 
stable solutions), and k - r is the degree of indeterminacy. 
5.1. Case 1 
Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and current-looking monetary policy, the system can 
be rewritten as 
* *
1 , 1 1
, 1 ,
(1 )( ) (1 ) [ ( ) ] ( ) ,
1 ( 1) 1 1
1 ( 1)( ) .
x
t t t H t t t t t t t
t H t H t t
a aE x x E a a r E
E x
+ + +
+
−
= + + − − − + − −
+ + + +
+
= −
π βλ ϕ ϕπ π ρ
ϕ β β ϕ ϕ ϕ
λ ϕπ π
β β
 
The two-dimensional subsystem for the conditional expectations, Hxt t t
′ =  ξ
πξ ξ , where 
1( )
x
t t tE xξ +=  and , 1( )Ht t H tE
πξ π +=  can be written as 
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* * *
1 1t t t t−= + +ξ Γ ξ Ψ ε Π η .  
     The eigenvalues for *1Γ  are  
2
1 2
1 1 4( )( )
,
2
A EBA A
β β β
µ µ
−
+ ± + −
= , 
where 
1 ,
1
(1 ) ,
( 1)
( 1).
xaA
aB
E
= + +
+
−
=
+
= +
π
λ
ϕ β
β
β ϕ
λ ϕ
 
Since the number of non-fundamental errors k = 2, when r = m = 1, there will be one degree of 
indeterminacy. This requires that only one of the roots, 𝜇𝜇1  and 𝜇𝜇2 , be unstable, resulting in this 
conclusion. 
Proposition 1. Under capital control, flexible exchange rate and current-looking monetary policy, there 
exists one degree of indeterminacy, when ( 1)(1 ) ( 1) 0xa aπλ ϕ β+ − + − > . 
5.2. Case 2 
Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and current-looking monetary policy, the system can 
be rewritten as 
*
1 , 1
, 1 ,
1 1( ) (1 ) ( ) [ ( ) ] ,
1 1 1
1 ( 1)( ) .
x
t t t H t t t t t
t H t H t t
a aE x x E a a r
E x
+ +
+
+
= + + − − − − + −
+ + +
+
= −
πϕ ϕπ ρ
ϕ β β ϕ ϕ
λ ϕπ π
β β
 
The eigenvalues of matrix *1Γ  are  
2
1 2
1 1 4( )( )
,
2
A EBA A
β β β
µ µ
−
+ ± + −
= , 
where 
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11 ,
1
1 ,
1
( 1).
xaA
aB
E
+
= + +
+
= −
+
= +
π
ϕ
ϕ β
β ϕ
λ ϕ
 
This result follows. 
Proposition 2. Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and current-looking monetary policy, there 
exists one degree of indeterminacy, when 2( 1) ( 1) [ ( 1) ] 0xa aπϕ β λ β β λ+ + − + − − > . 
5.3. Case 3 
Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary policy, the system can 
be rewritten as 
* *
1 , 1 1
, 1 ,
( 1) (1 )(1 ) ( ) 1 [ ( ) ] ( ) ,
1 ( 1) 1 1
1 ( 1)( ) .
x
t t t H t t t t t t t
t H t H t t
a a aE x x E a a r E
E x
+ + +
+
 −  −
− = − − − − + − − + + + + 
+
= −
π πλ ϕ ϕπ π ρ
ϕ β β ϕ ϕ ϕ
λ ϕπ π
β β
  
The eigenvalues of matrix *1Γ  are  
2
1 2
1 1 4( )( )
,
2
A A A EB
F F Fβ β β
µ µ
−
+ ± + −
= , 
where 
( 1)1 ,
1 ,
( 1)
( 1),
1 .
1
x
aA
aB
E
aF
−
= −
−
=
+
= +
= −
+
π
π
λ
β
β ϕ
λ ϕ
ϕ
 
This result follows. 
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Proposition 3. Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary policy, 
there exists one degree of indeterminacy, when 
1
( 1)(1 ) ( 1) 0
x
x
a
a aπ
ϕ
λ ϕ β
< +
 + − + − >
  or  
1
( 1)(1 ) ( 1) 0
x
x
a
a aπ
ϕ
λ ϕ β
> +
 + − + − <
. 
5.4. Case 4 
Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary policy, the system can be 
rewritten as 
( )
*
1 , 1
, 1 ,
( 1 ) 1(1 ) ( ) 1 [ ( ) ] ,
1 1 1
1 ( 1)( ) .
x
t t t H t t t t t
t H t H t t
a a aE x x E a a r
E x
+ +
+
  + − 
− = + − − − − + −  + + +   
+
= −
π πλ ϕ ϕπ ρ
ϕ β β β ϕ ϕ
λ ϕπ π
β β
 
The eigenvalues of matrix *1Γ  are  
2
1 2
1 1 4( )( )
,
2
A A A EB
F F Fβ β β
µ µ
−
+ ± + −
= , 
where 
( 1 )1 ,
1 ,
( 1)
( 1),
1 .
1
x
aA
aB
E
aF
+ −
= +
= −
+
= +
= −
+
π
π
λ ϕ
β
β β ϕ
λ ϕ
ϕ
 
 This result follows. 
Proposition 4. Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary policy, there 
exists one degree of indeterminacy, when 
1
( 1)( 1 ) ( 1) 0
x
x
a
a aπ
ϕ
λ ϕ ϕ β
< +
 + + − + − >
  or  
1
( 1)( 1 ) ( 1) 0
x
x
a
a aπ
ϕ
λ ϕ ϕ β
> +
 + + − + − <
. 
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We summarize the indeterminacy conditions for the four cases in the table below. 
Table 1:  Indeterminacy Conditions 
Policies Indeterminacy conditions 
Capital control, Flexible exchange rates,           
Current-looking monetary policy 
( 1)(1 ) ( 1) 0xa aπλ ϕ β+ − + − >  
Capital control, Fixed exchange rates,                   
Current-looking monetary policy 
2( 1) ( 1) [ ( 1) ] 0xa aπϕ β λ β β λ+ + − + − − >  
Capital control, Flexible exchange rates,             
Forward-looking monetary policy 
1
( 1)(1 ) ( 1) 0
x
x
a
a aπ
ϕ
λ ϕ β
< +
 + − + − >
 
or 
1
( 1)(1 ) ( 1) 0
x
x
a
a aπ
ϕ
λ ϕ β
> +
 + − + − <
 
Capital control, Fixed exchange rates,                 
Forward-looking monetary policy 
1
( 1)( 1 ) ( 1) 0
x
x
a
a aπ
ϕ
λ ϕ ϕ β
< +
 + + − + − >
                      
or 
1
( 1)( 1 ) ( 1) 0
x
x
a
a aπ
ϕ
λ ϕ ϕ β
> +
 + + − + − <
 
 
6. Bifurcation 
In this section, we investigate the existence of bifurcation in the system under the four policy cases. 
With Hopf bifurcation, the economy can converge to a stable limit cycle or diverge from an unstable 
limit cycle. We use the following theorem from Gandolfo (2010) to determine conditions for the 
existence of Hopf bifurcation.  
Theorem.  Consider the system, 1 ( , )t ty yϕ α+ = . Suppose that for each α in the relevant interval, the 
system has a smooth family of equilibrium points, ( )e ey y α= , at which the eigenvalues are complex 
conjugates, 1,2 ( ) ( )iλ θ α ω α= ± . If there is a critical value, 0α , of the parameter α such that 
(1) the eigenvalues’ modulus becomes unity at 0α , but the eigenvalues are not roots of unity (from the 
first up to the fourth), namely 
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2 2
1,2 0 1,2 0( ) 1, ( ) 1
j= + + = ≠λ α θ ω λ α  for j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 
(2) 
0
1,2 ( ) 0
d
d
α α
λ α
α
=
≠ , 
then there is an invariant closed curve bifurcating from 0α .  
6.1. Case 1 
We rewrite the system in 2×2 form as 
1
, 1 ,
( )
1( )
t t t
t
t H t H t
A BE x x
EE
+
+
− 
    = + +    −     
ΨZ C
π π
β β
,      (34) 
where A , B , E , and tZ  are defined the same as in Case 1 for indeterminacy. The characteristic 
equation is  
2 1( ) 0A EBAµ µ
β β
−
− + + = . 
For bifurcation to exist, the following conditions must be satisfied: 
2
2 2
1,2 1 2
1( ) 4 0,
1.
A EBD A
A EB
−
= + − <
−
= + = = =
β β
µ θ ω µ µ
β
 
 This result follows. 
Proposition 5. Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and current-looking monetary policy, 
there would exist Hopf bifurcation, if 2 2[( 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1) (1 ) 0xa aπϕ β λ β λ ϕ β+ + − + + + − < and
( 1)(1 ) 0xa aπϕ β λ+ − + + = . However, according to the meaning of the parameters, the second 
equation cannot be satisfied. 
6.2. Case 2 
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We again rewrite the system in 2×2 form as equations (34), but with A , B , E , and tZ  defined as 
in Case 2 for indeterminacy. The characteristic equation and the bifurcation condition equations are the 
same as in Case 1, but with the different settings of A , B , E , and tZ . 
 This result follows. 
Proposition 6. Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and current-looking monetary policy, 
there exists Hopf bifurcation, when 2 2[( 1)( ) ] 4 ( 1) ( 1 ) 0xa aπϕ β ϕ β λ ϕ ϕ β+ + + + + + − < and
2(1 )( 1) (1 )( 1) ( 1) 0xa aπλ ϕ β β ϕ λ β ϕ β− + + − + + + + = . Since
(1 )(1 )βθ θλ
θ
− −
= with 0 < β < 1, 
and 0 < θ < 1, it follows that λ  goes to+∞ , when θ approaches 0. In this case, it is possible for the 
second equality to hold. 
6.3. Case 3 
We again rewrite the system in 2×2 form as equations (34), but with A , B , E , and tZ  defined as 
in Case 3 for indeterminacy. The characteristic equation is  
2 1( ) 0A A EB
F F
µ µ
β β
−
− + + = . 
For bifurcation to exist, the following conditions must be satisfied. 
2
2 2
1,2 1 2
1( ) 4 0,
1.
A A EBD
F F
A EB
F
−
= + − <
−
= + = = =
β β
µ θ ω µ µ
β
 
 This result follows. 
Proposition 7. Under capital control, flexible exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary policy, 
there could exist Hopf bifurcation, if
2[( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1)(1 )( 1 ) 0x xa a a aπ πβ ϕ λ ϕ λ ϕ ϕ− + − − + + + + − + − <  and
(1 )( 1) 0xaβ ϕ β− + + = . However, according to the economic meaning of the parameters, the 
second equation cannot be satisfied with parameter values within their feasible range. 
6.4. Case 4 
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We again rewrite the system in 2×2 form as equations (34), but with A , B , E , and tZ  defined the 
same as in Case 4 for indeterminacy. The characteristic equation and the bifurcation condition equations 
are the same as in Case 3, but with different settings of A , B , E , and tZ .  
This result follows. 
Proposition 8. Under capital control, fixed exchange rates, and forward-looking monetary policy, 
there could exist Hopf bifurcation, if
2[( ( 1 ) 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1)( 1 )( 1 ) 0x xa a a aπ πβ λ ϕ ϕ λ ϕ ϕ ϕ+ + − − + + + + + − + − <  and
(1 )( 1) 0xaβ ϕ β− + + = . However, according to the meaning of the parameters, the second equation 
cannot be satisfied. 
We summarize the conditions for Hopf bifurcation to exist in the four cases with the parameters 
within their feasible range.  
Table 2:  Bifurcation Conditions 
Policies Bifurcation conditions Possible 
Case 1 
2 2[( 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1) (1 ) 0
( 1)(1 ) 0
x
x
a a
a a
π
π
ϕ β λ β λ ϕ β
ϕ β λ
+ + − + + + − <
+ − + + =
 No 
Case 2 
2 2
2
[( 1)( ) ] 4 ( 1) ( 1 ) 0
(1 )( 1) (1 )( 1) ( 1) 0
x
x
a a
a a
π
π
ϕ β ϕ β λ ϕ ϕ β
λ ϕ β β ϕ λ β ϕ β
+ + + + + + − <
− + + − + + + + =
 Yes 
Case 3 
2[( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1)(1 )( 1 ) 0
(1 )( 1) 0
x x
x
a a a a
a
π πβ ϕ λ ϕ λ ϕ ϕ
β ϕ β
− + − − + + + + − + − <
− + + =
 No 
Case 4 
2[( ( 1 ) 1)( 1) ] 4 ( 1)( 1 )( 1 ) 0
(1 )( 1) 0
x x
x
a a a a
a
π πβ λ ϕ ϕ λ ϕ ϕ ϕ
β ϕ β
+ + − − + + + + + − + − <
− + + =
 No 
 
7. Economic Implication 
Case 1: Indeterminacy is determined by howλ  and aπ  are coordinated with xa . To assure that the 
summation is larger than zero, aπ  must be between zero and one. Ifλ is large, then xa  can be large or 
small, so long as λ is sufficiently larger than xa . If λ is small, xa can only be small to make the 
summation larger than zero.  
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Case 2: To assure the summation is larger than zero, we must have 1 0β λ+ − > . In addition, aπ
must not be too large, sinceλ appears both in the front part 1β λ+ −  and the back part aπλ . If aπ is 
too large, the negative part in the summation will outweigh the positive part and make the summation 
negative. Finally, xa cannot be too large. Regarding bifurcation in Case 2, the condition will be satisfied 
whenλ  is larger than one, with relevant coordination of xa and aπ  
Case 3: Compared with Case 1, Case 3 must consider xa  first. When xa is small, the summation is 
larger than zero, only if aπ  is between zero and one. In this situation, it does not matter whether λ  is 
large or small. When xa  is large, there are two possibilities for indeterminacy to appear. One is that 
aπ  is also large, regardless of whether λ  is large or small. The other is when aπ  is small, in which 
case λ  must not be larger than xa . 
Case 4:  This case is similar to Case 3, but more ambiguous, because the condition also depends on 
ϕ  in a subtle way. For example, we must consider 1 aπϕ + −  instead of 1 aπ− . 
We summarize the economic implications for these several conditions in the table below. We find 
that expectations in the interest feedback rule create possibilities for indeterminacy. For forward-
looking monetary policy, both passive and positive feedback on inflation and output gap may lead to 
indeterminacy, regardless of stickiness of prices. Compared with flexible exchange rates, the conditions 
with fixed exchange rates is more complicated. Not only can bifurcation exist under fixed exchange 
rates, but also indeterminacy, depending upon the labor elasticity of substitution. Policy caution is 
needed under fixed exchange rates with capital controls, because price setting and labor behavior must 
be taken into consideration as well.  
Our results expand upon prior results on the relationship between monetary policy and 
indeterminacy. Under capital controls, not only feedback on inflation can lead to indeterminacy. 
Indeterminacy conditions can also depend upon feedback on both inflation and output gap. 
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Table 3:  Summary Results 
Policies Indeterminacy Bifurcation 
Capital control,  
Flexible exchange rates,              
Current-looking  
monetary policy 
(1) Prices flexible, passive feedback on 
inflation. 
or 
(2) Prices sticky, passive feedback both 
on inflation and output gap. 
 
Capital control,  
Fixed exchange rates,                   
Current-looking  
monetary policy 
Passive feedback both on inflation and 
output gap and sticky prices 
Prices flexible 
Capital control,  
Flexible exchange rates,             
Forward-looking  
monetary policy 
(1) Passive/positive feedback both on 
inflation and output gap. 
or 
(2) Positive feedback on output gap and 
passive feedback on inflation. 
 
Capital control,  
Fixed exchange rate,                 
Forward-looking  
monetary policy 
(1) Passive/positive feedback both on 
inflation and output gap 
(with condition on labor elasticity of 
substitution). 
or 
(2) Positive feedback on output gap and 
passive feedback on inflation 
(with condition on labor elasticity of 
substitution). 
 
 
8. Testing for Indeterminacy 
In this section, we test indeterminacy using Bayesian likelihood estimation, following Lubik and 
Schorfheide (2004). We compute the posterior probability of the determinate and the indeterminate 
regions of the parameter space. Then we estimate the parameters’ posterior means and 90-percent 
probability intervals. We also study impulse responses of the fundamental and sunspot shocks. We use 
GAUSS for computations. 
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8.1. Model Used for Testing Indeterminacy 
8.1.1. Case 1 
In Case 1, the model is: 
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8.1.2. Case 2 
In Case 2, the model is: 
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8.1.3. Case 3 
In Case 3, the model is: 
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which can be written as (35) with 
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8.1.4. Case 4 
In Case 4, the model is: 
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8.2. Estimation Results 
We use quarterly postwar U.S. data on output, inflation, and nominal interest rates from the database, 
FRED, of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We consider the following two sample periods: 1954(3) 
to 1971(4) and 1976(1) to 1985(4). These two periods are during and right after the Bretton Woods 
System, during which the U.S. was imposing capital controls. During the first sample period, the U.S. 
dollar was tied to gold, while after the Bretton Woods System had ended, the link to gold was terminated.  
The U.S. dollar became a freely floating fiat currency. The models of Case 1 and Case 3 are fitted to 
the data of 1976(1)  to 1985(4), while Case 2 and Case 4 are fitted to the data of 1954(3) to 1971(4). 
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The output gap is calculated as the log of real GDP minus the log of real potential GDP. Inflation is 
calculated as the log of the CPI, while the nominal interest rate is calculated as log of the Effective 
Federal Funds Rate, since the model is log linearized. The HP filter is used to remove a smooth trend 
from the output gap series. 
 
 
Figure 1. Foreign Assets in the U.S. (Net Capital Inflow) 
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 Figure 2. Gold Fixing Price in U.S. Dollars  
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8.2.1. Case 1 
Table 4. Prior Distributions 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
aπ  Gamma 0.5000 0.1000 
xa  Gamma 0.3000 0.1000 
ω Beta 0.8500 0.1000 
*π  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
ϕ  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
zρ  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
Rρ  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
πρ  Beta 0.7000 0.1000 
zRρ  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
zπρ  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
Rπρ  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
Mπζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
rσ  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
zσ  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
Rσ  Inverse Gamma 0.1000 4.0000 
πσ  Inverse Gamma 0.1000 4.0000 
ζσ  Inverse Gamma 0.2000 4.0000 
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Table 5. Determinacy versus Indeterminacy 
Probability 
Determinacy Indeterminacy 
0.1107 0.8893 
Notes: The posterior probabilities are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
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Table 6. Parameter Estimation Results 
Parameter Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
aπ  0.5002 0.1009 0.3336 0.6591 
xa  0.3000 0.0999 0.1371 0.4525 
ω 0.8492 0.0996 0.6861 1.0119 
*π  4.0004 1.9919 0.9583 6.9374 
*r  1.9997 1.0001 0.4856 3.4795 
ϕ  2.0014 0.7494 0.8314 3.1666 
zρ  0.8998 0.1001 0.7605 1.0000 
Rρ  0.4993 0.2003 0.1613 0.8166 
πρ  0.6996 0.0997 0.5417 0.8664 
zRρ  -0.0035 0.3996 -0.6415 0.6721 
zπρ  -0.0013 0.4010 -0.6496 0.6676 
Rπρ  -0.0013 0.3983 -0.6478 0.6677 
rM ζ  0.0009 0.9981 -1.6412 1.6344 
zM ζ  -0.0025 1.0036 -1.6662 1.6292 
RM ζ  0.0026 1.0009 -1.6204 1.6621 
Mπζ  -0.0037 1.0017 -1.6971 1.5905 
rσ  0.3143 0.1636 0.1323 0.4963 
zσ  1.0031 0.5350 0.4320 1.5914 
Rσ  0.1254 0.0666 0.0531 0.1988 
πσ  0.1256 0.0667 0.0539 0.1991 
ζσ  0.2502 0.1314 0.1082 0.3962 
       Notes: The posterior summary statistics are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
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8.2.2. Case 2 
Table 7. Prior Distributions 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
aπ  Gamma 0.5000 0.1000 
xa  Gamma 0.3000 0.1000 
ω Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
*π  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
ϕ  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
zρ  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
Rρ  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
zRρ  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
rσ  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
zσ  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
Rσ  Inverse Gamma 0.1000 4.0000 
ζσ  Inverse Gamma 0.2000 4.0000 
 
Table 8. Determinacy versus Indeterminacy 
Probability 
Determinacy Indeterminacy 
0.0926 0.9074 
Notes: The posterior probabilities are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
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Table 9. Parameter Estimation Results 
Parameter Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
aπ  0.4998 0.1004 0.3345 0.6595 
xa  0.3002 0.0997 0.1432 0.4586 
ω 0.9003 0.1005 0.7345 1.0636 
*π  3.9917 2.0032 0.8760 6.8850 
*r  2.0021 1.0022 0.4528 3.4439 
φ 2.0060 0.7488 0.8162 3.1496 
zρ  0.8999 0.1001 0.7599 1.0000 
Rρ  0.4995 0.1997 0.1701 0.8255 
zRρ  -0.0002 0.3999 -0.6489 0.6682 
rM ζ  0.0025 0.9941 -1.6198 1.6482 
zM ζ  -0.0053 1.0021 -1.6673 1.6133 
RM ζ  0.0015 1.0028 -1.6566 1.6387 
rσ  0.3137 0.1673 0.1308 0.4916 
zσ  1.0016 0.5113 0.4258 1.5797 
Rσ  0.1255 0.0646 0.0551 0.2006 
ζσ  0.2503 0.1326 0.1059 0.3939 
Notes: The posterior summary statistics are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
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8.2.3. Case 3 
Table 10. Prior Distributions 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
aπ  Gamma 0.5000 0.1000 
xa  Gamma 0.3000 0.1000 
ω Beta 0.8500 0.1000 
*π  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
ϕ  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
zρ  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
Rρ  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
πρ  Beta 0.7000 0.1000 
zRρ  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
zπρ  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
Rπρ  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
Mπζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
rσ  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
zσ  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
Rσ  Inverse Gamma 0.1000 4.0000 
πσ  Inverse Gamma 0.1000 4.0000 
ζσ  Inverse Gamma 0.2000 4.0000 
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Table 11. Determinacy versus Indeterminacy 
Probability 
Determinacy Indeterminacy 
0.1144 0.8856 
Notes: The posterior probabilities are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.  
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Table 12. Parameter Estimation Results 
Parameter Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
aπ  0.4998 0.1002 0.3349 0.6597 
xa  0.3005 0.1002 0.1369 0.4530 
ω 0.8503 0.1008 0.6837 1.0142 
*π  3.9963 1.9854 0.9727 6.9271 
*r  1.9999 1.0009 0.4681 3.4823 
ϕ  1.9971 0.7543 0.7985 3.1451 
zρ  0.8996 0.1006 0.7594 1.0000 
Rρ  0.5001 0.1996 0.1664 0.8230 
πρ  0.7006 0.0999 0.5443 0.8676 
zRρ  0.0014 0.3995 -0.6399 0.6689 
zπρ  0.0028 0.3983 -0.6546 0.6572 
Rπρ  0.0016 0.3987 -0.6622 0.6467 
rM ζ  -0.0042 0.9955 -1.6307 1.6422 
zM ζ  -0.0139 0.9987 -1.6650 1.6158 
RM ζ  -0.0003 1.0005 -1.6519 1.6362 
Mπζ  0.0001 0.9980 -1.6511 1.6273 
rσ  0.3118 0.1601 0.1352 0.4914 
zσ  1.0021 0.5104 0.4244 1.5796 
Rσ  0.1253 0.0660 0.0538 0.1983 
πσ  0.1252 0.0656 0.0528 0.1987 
ζσ  0.2503 0.1311 0.1060 0.3937 
       Notes: The posterior summary statistics are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
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8.2.4. Case 4 
Table 13. Prior Distributions 
Parameter Density Prior Mean 
Prior Standard 
Deviation 
aπ  Gamma 0.5000 0.1000 
xa  Gamma 0.3000 0.1000 
ω Beta 0.8500 0.1000 
*π  Gamma 4.0000 2.0000 
*r  Gamma 2.0000 1.0000 
ϕ  Gamma 2.0000 0.7500 
zρ  Beta 0.9000 0.1000 
Rρ  Beta 0.5000 0.2000 
zRρ  Normal 0.0000 0.4000 
rM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
zM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
RM ζ  Normal 0.0000 1.0000 
rσ  Inverse Gamma 0.2500 4.0000 
zσ  Inverse Gamma 0.8000 4.0000 
Rσ  Inverse Gamma 0.1000 4.0000 
ζσ  Inverse Gamma 0.2000 4.0000 
 
Table 14. Determinacy versus Indeterminacy 
Probability 
Determinacy Indeterminacy 
0.0499 0.9501 
Notes: The posterior probabilities are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
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Table 15. Parameter Estimation Results 
Parameter Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Lower 
Bound 
90 % Posterior 
Interval Upper 
Bound 
aπ  0.4996 0.0997 0.3354 0.6587 
xa  0.3005 0.1001 0.1395 0.4547 
ω 0.8502 0.1000 0.6842 1.0115 
*π  3.9954 2.0034 0.9832 6.9734 
*r  2.0053 0.9997 0.4316 3.4375 
φ 2.0023 0.7502 0.8059 3.1484 
zρ  0.9006 0.0990 0.7623 1.0000 
Rρ  0.4993 0.1996 0.1683 0.8236 
zRρ  -0.0016 0.4000 -0.6509 0.6632 
rM ζ  0.0010 1.0040 -1.6544 1.6314 
zM ζ  -0.0054 1.0008 -1.6267 1.6727 
RM ζ  -0.0016 0.9949 -1.6664 1.5953 
rσ  0.3133 0.1615 0.1337 0.4965 
zσ  1.0033 0.5199 0.4280 1.5854 
Rσ  0.1254 0.0665 0.0527 0.1965 
ζσ  0.2508 0.1314 0.1079 0.3962 
Notes: The posterior summary statistics are calculated by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 
 
The posterior probabilities of the determinate and indeterminate regions indicate that indeterminacy 
is a greater risk under a fixed exchange rate regime than under a flexible exchange rate regime. 
8.3. Propagation of Shocks 
The response of three endogenous variables to one-standard deviation structural shocks are reported 
in Figure 3 with flexible exchange rate and current-looking monetary policy. Figure 4 contains the 
results with fixed exchange rates and current-looking monetary policy. Figure 5 contains the results 
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with flexible exchange rates and forward-looking monetary policy. Figure 6 contains the results with 
fixed exchange rates and forward-looking monetary policy. 
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, an unanticipated tightening of monetary policy will lead the 
output to decrease. Compared with forward-looking monetary policy, response of the three variables 
will be smaller in current-looking monetary policy. However, under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
output will have different responses in current-looking monetary policy and forward-looking monetary 
policy. With a current-looking monetary policy, output will rise after a short period, when policy 
interest rate is increased. 
A positive technology shock will reduce the marginal costs of production, thereby increasing output 
and lowering inflation under both exchange rate regimes. Interest rate will also drop in response to the 
technology shock. 
Faced with a positive foreign interest rate shock, oputput will decrease immediately in flexible 
exchange rate regime. While with fixed exchange rate, after a initial drop, output will bounce back, 
reaching a temporary higher level than the steady state. Under both exchange rate regimes, domestic 
inflation and interest rates will rise in response to a positive foreign interest rate shock. 
Foreign inflation shock will only take effects under the flexible exchange rate regime. Domestic 
output will increase immediately. Domestic inflation and interest rates will drop. 
In response to a sunspot shock, output, inflation, and interest rates will all increase. This reflects the 
fact that beliefs of higher output, inflation, and interest rates are validated by the actual increase, which 
is the self-fulfilling prophecy. In addition, sunspot shock has a larger effect on inflation and interest 
rates than on output. 
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Figure 3. Impulse Response under Flexible Exchange Rate and Current-looking Monetary Policy 
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Figure 4. Impulse Response under Fixed Exchange Rate and Current-looking Monetary Policy 
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Figure 5. Impulse Response under Flexible Exchange Rate and Forward-looking Monetary Policy 
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Figure 6. Impulse Response under Fixed Exchange Rate and Forward-looking Monetary Policy 
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9. Numerical Bifurcation Analysis 
In this section, we detect bifurcation numerically. In line with our former analysis, we find 
numerically that bifurcation exists in Case 2. We used MatContM and Mathematica to perform the 
computations. We find that at certain values of the deep parameters, the dynamical system becomes 
unstable. Several kinds of bifurcation appear at those values, both when computed forward and 
backward at those values. Notice that xa  and aπ  are the interest rate feedbacks in the Taylor rule to 
the output gap and to inflation respectively. We find that when capital controls are imposed, policy 
makers should be cautious, when adjusting the nominal interest rate under a fixed exchange rate regime 
with current-looking monetary policy . 
9.1.  Case 2 
To explore bifurcation phenomena in thase, we definte a and b such that 
a = 21
1
xa ϕ
ϕ β
+
+ +
+
, 
b = 2
1 ( 1)(1 )
( 1)
xa aπλ ϕ λ
β β β ϕ
+ + −
+ +
+
. 
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Table 16. Numerical Bifurcation Results 
Variable 
parameter 
Fixed point 
continuation 
Eigenvalues 
 
Origin Bifurcation continuation 
Vary a (1) Branch point 
a = 4.88, b = 3.88 
Real and 
positive 
Unstable 
improper node 
Backward Branch point 
(2) Period doubling 
a = -4.88, b = 3.88 
Real and 
negative 
Asymptotically 
stable 
improper node 
Forward Resonance 1-2 
LPPD 
Vary b (3) Branch point 
a = 4.85, b = 3.85 
Real and 
positive 
Unstable 
improper node 
Backward Branch point 
(4) Neutral saddle 
a = 4.85, b = 1 
Real and 
positive 
Unstable 
improper node 
 
(5) Period doubling 
a = 4.85, b = -5.85 
Real with 
opposite 
signs 
Saddle point Backward LPPD 
Resonance 1-2 
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Figure 7. a = 4.88, b = 3.88 (Branch point) 
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Figure 8. a = -4.88, b = 3.88 (Period doubling)
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Figure 9. a = 4.85, b = 3.85 (Branch point)
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Figure 10. a = 4.85, b = 1 (Neutral saddle)
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Figure 11. a = 4.85, b = -5.85 (Period doubling) 
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 Figure 12. Bifurcation Curve in the (a,b)-Plane  
 
10. Conclusion 
We investigated the dynamical properties and stability of the macroeconomy under capital controls. 
Conditional on different exchange rate regimes and monetary policies, we classified our analysis into 
four different cases. We show that under certain conditions of the deep parameters and monetary policy 
parameters, the macro economy will have multiple equilibria and can be unstable, especially under 
fixed exchange rate regimes and current-looking monetary policy. Monetary authorities need to be 
cautious, when they make policy decisions with capital controls. Only when taking these complexities 
into consideration, can macro-prudential policy with capital controls play its role in stabilizing the 
macro economy. The common view that capital controls  can  provide a simple solution to difficult 
problems can be seriously misguided, producing unanticipated risk. The economy could become 
trapped in a worse equilibrium or in an instability region, leading the economy onto a volatile path. 
Under capital control, policy makers could move the economic system from indeterminate 
equilibria to determinate equilibrium by adjusting non-fundamental forecasting error to the set of 
fundamental shocks.  One method, would be by changing people’s belief. An altnermative method, 
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more directly under government control, would be by changing the value of policy parameters to move 
the system from an instability region to stability region.  
We assume purchasing power parity, thereby removing terms of trade and exchange rates from the 
dynamical systems. Extensions of our model could permit solving for the dynamics of exchange rates 
and terms of trade. In addition, some of our results produce indeterminacy, and some produce 
deterministic business cycles without stochastic shocks. Extensions to explore stability in a stochastic 
economic system is a future research goal. 
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